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ABSTRACT We develop a novel, sense-making perspective on corruption in transition economies. 
Prior research has focused on understanding why some entrepreneurs are more likely to pay 
bribes than others. It typically assumes that paying bribes will lead to an intended – albeit unfair 
– competitive advantage. We challenge this assumption and uncover a bribery paradox: drawing 
upon sense-making logic, we argue that beyond gaining an immediate benefit from bribing, 
entrepreneurs who frequently pay bribes may in the longer run be enacting a ‘new normal’ busi-
ness environment perceived as high in obstacles, especially in transition countries. As sense mak-
ing is grounded in identity construction and one’s social context, we argue that owners of  family 
firms will be especially vulnerable to the dangers of  perceiving greater obstacles over time and 
enacting an obstacle-ridden ‘new normal’ business environment. We find empirical support for 
our framework on a sample of  310 privately held small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
from 22 transition economies.
Keywords: bribery paradox, degree of  business obstacles, family- vs. nonfamily-owned SMEs, 
frequency of  bribery, new normal business environments, sense making, transition economies
INTRODUCTION
Prior research has tended to assume that entrepreneurs who bribe public officials garner im-
mediate benefits, such as favourable treatment, access to limited government goods, and an 
unfair competitive advantage (Martin et al., 2007; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Ufere et al., 2012). 
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But whether entrepreneurs who pay bribes actually sense a genuine benefit accruing over 
time, is not known. In transition economies where corruption is constantly changing in 
volume, form, and acceptance (Christensen et al., 2019; Olimpieva, 2010), bribes can 
bring immediate privileges to an entrepreneur, but over time they can also infect and spread 
within a community (Li et al., 2015), leading to a ‘new normal’ business environment that 
is afflicted with corruption. The possible occurrence of  this bribery paradox (immediate 
benefits to the briber, but a more corrupt environment in the longer run) leads to our 
research question: do entrepreneurs from transition economies who frequently bribe see 
those bribes as ‘grease money’ that lessens their business obstacles? Or rather, do they see 
frequent bribes as ‘sand in the wheels of  progress’ that increases their business obstacles?
While the preponderance of  research has sought to predict who pays bribes and why 
(e.g., Ashforth et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003; Ufere et al., 2012), we 
investigate instead how the frequent (or infrequent) payment of  bribes shapes entre-
preneurs’ perception of  their business environment. The frequency of  bribes refers to 
the rate of  occurrence with which firms extend bribes to government officials to obtain 
services and deal with bureaucracy during the regular course of  doing business. Several 
theories have been utilized to predict the payment of  bribes: for example, transaction 
cost economics (Kaufmann, 1997; Rodriguez et al., 2005), anomie theory (Martin et 
al., 2007), theories on culture (Chen et al., 2008), and institutional theory (Ashforth and 
Anand, 2003; Misangyi et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010). In contrast, we sought to 
explore how entrepreneurs are active authors of  their own reality, with the payment 
of  bribes shaping how they perceive their business environment. Here, we extend the 
sense-making perspective (Weick, 1995) to bribery in transition economies by arguing 
that as entrepreneurs more frequently pay bribes, they create a ‘new normal’ business 
environment that is perceived as increasingly harsh. However, for entrepreneurs who 
infrequently bribe, their ‘new normal’ is likely to be perceived as more supportive of  
business. Thus, as transition economies evolve, the ‘new normal’ is likely to be perceived 
differently by entrepreneurs depending on their frequency of  bribery.
Further, because scholars have called for research to consider how the social context 
and embedded social identities influence sensemaking (Lockett et al., 2014; Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014), we propose that family firms and nonfamily firms will view the 
subsequent effects of  their bribes differently. Family firms are unique because their fam-
ily identity is inextricably tied to the family firm and their business is embedded in the 
social context of  the family (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2010). In making 
sense of  their business environment in light of  their bribery, we hypothesize that owners 
of  family firms will view their ‘new normal’ through the lens of  the family, leading to 
greater perceived business obstacles as the frequency of  bribes increases.
We test our framework on 310 privately owned SMEs from 22 transition economies who 
participated in the 2002 and 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS). Transition economies refer to countries in Eastern Europe that were 
members of  the former USSR as well as countries in Central and Eastern Europe that 
were under Soviet influence. Despite transitioning from centrally planned to more mar-
ket-based economies, bribery remains a significant problem in many transition econo-
mies due to their government’s discretion over the use of  valuable resources, information, 
and law enforcement (Kim et al., 2018). Entrepreneurs, defined as owner-managers of  
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small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), are particularly vulnerable to bribery pres-
sures because they do not have the economic clout or bargaining power of  large, public 
firms to defend themselves against corrupt public officials (Chen et al., 2008; Verbeke 
et al., 2014). By focusing on two waves of  data on SMEs in transition economies, we 
were able to assess how entrepreneurs’ 2002 frequency of  bribes affected their 2005 
perceived business obstacles after controlling for their 2002 perceived business obstacles. 
Unlike previous research, we were therefore able to investigate how entrepreneurs view 
the consequences of  their bribery activity over time. Our study also extends prior research 
that has traditionally confined bribery to static terms, that is, whether firms bribe or not, 
to instead, focus on the frequency of  bribes. This is an important theoretical extension 
because it provides further insight into how repeated actions can cause prolonged mental 
preoccupation with business obstacles. Bribery frequency allows us to discern between 
those entrepreneurs who rarely, if  ever, pay bribes and those who frequently partake in 
such behaviour, and thus have made bribery a ‘new normal’ business practice.
Overall, this study makes three contributions. First, we offer a theory on the enactment 
of  corruption that acknowledges how entrepreneurs’ actions shape their perceived busi-
ness environment over time. Rather than seek to predict an entrepreneur’s propensity 
to bribe, which has been the main focus of  prior research, we explore instead how their 
frequency of  bribes influences their perception of  the ‘new normal’ business environment. 
Second, by proposing that entrepreneurs who own and manage family versus nonfamily 
firms (referred to as family firm and nonfamily firm owners for ease of  exposition) make 
sense of  their bribery activity in different ways, we help explain why some entrepreneurs 
may see bribes as reducing business obstacles and others as creating such obstacles. Third, 
we contribute to the sensemaking perspective by highlighting how the frequency of  an action 
(i.e., frequency of  bribes) is important in understanding the salience with which an action 
is taken into account when reflecting on one’s version of  reality. In so doing, we also con-
tribute to the broader literature on the ‘new normal’ (El-Erian, 2010; Florida, 2010; Ghai 
et al., 2011; Thirlwell, 2010; Wolf, 2009) and the entrepreneurship literature on corrup-
tion in transition economies (Estrin et al., 2013; Ufere et al., 2012): we develop a frame-
work that recognizes how entrepreneurs are active participants in their environments who 
author different versions of  reality based on the frequency of  their corrupt acts.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
As our conceptual framework integrates insights from two literatures – the literature on 
‘new normals’ and the literature on corruption in transition economies – we first briefly 
review each before advancing to our theoretical development.
Existing Research on ‘New Normals’
The term ‘new normal’ was coined by Dr. Mohamed El-Erian, PIMCO’s CEO and Co-
Chief  Investment Officer, at the height of  the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 (El-Erian, 
2010) to capture how events that were previously abnormal had become commonplace, 
creating a fundamentally new economic landscape. Specifically, the ‘new normal’ was 
used to describe the difficulty of  the global financial system to revert to its pre-2007 state 
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of  high leverage, strong growth, and low government intervention in the economy. The 
post-2007 crisis ‘new normal’ was triggered by preceding global events like the Fall of  the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 (Fukuyama, 1989; Davis, 2009; Thirlwell, 2010). Appendix A pro-
vides a historical overview of  the different stages of  global ‘new normals’ since the 1930s.
Throughout history, any ‘new normal’ state has reflected a novel joint state of  affairs, 
at both the macro-level (e.g., government policies and societal norms) and the micro-level 
(behaviour of  firms and households). We suggest that these two levels influence each 
other through what we refer to as downward cascading (from the macro-level to the 
firm or household) and upward cascading effects (from the firm or household to the 
macro-level), whereby cascades capture the flow of  institutional signals surrounding a 
behaviour from one level to the next. Our characterization of  cascading effects is in line 
with research on cascading leadership that explains how leaders’ values and behaviours 
flow from one level of  the organization to the next (e.g., Bass et al., 1987; Liu et al., 2012; 
Yang et al., 2010). However, we extend the cascading effect concept by also considering 
how phenomena at the macro-level affect firm behaviour at the micro-level. This altered 
micro-level firm behaviour will, in turn, influence the macro-level context of  doing busi-
ness in a country, with downward and upward cascades occurring between the macro- 
and micro-levels to develop a ‘new normal’ institutional environment.
Specifically, a ‘new normal’ state typically starts with a triggering event, such as a 
quantum change in the political, economic, social, and/or technological environment. 
This then leads to large-scale, high-frequency (i.e., generalized or recurring) adaptations 
to the new situation by a myriad of  actors at the macro- and micro- levels, leading to 
widespread effects that diverge from the past status quo. For management research pur-
poses, it is therefore important to identify and carve out a segment of  any ‘new normal’ 
situation, whereby a specific impact of  one particular quantum change is assessed. As 
one example of  a ‘new normal,’ the introduction of  the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) influenced how governments managed a variety of  budgetary and financial deci-
sion-making processes, and how EU-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) addressed 
institutional risk within the region. Research revealed that the common prediction from 
international business theory that associated higher institutional risk with a preference 
for joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries (e.g., Grøgaard and Verbeke, 2012; 
Meyer et al., 2009; Yiu and Makino, 2002), was reversed (Hillemann et al., 2018). Given 
the presence of  high-quality regional institutions and a common currency, these MNEs 
began to perceive the usage of  joint ventures in a higher-risk country as inviting cor-
ruption from the national level and encouraging undesirable features of  institutional 
risk being imposed on the firm’s operations. The new default (ceteris paribus) therefore 
evolved to a view of  joint venture partners as possible carriers of  institutional risk, rather 
than as actors capable of  reducing such risk for the foreign MNE. This also implies that 
MNEs still preferring joint ventures, based on the old paradigm that a local partner can 
more easily cope with local institutional risk, would de facto be enacting a ‘new normal’ 
environment fraught with higher risks than if  they had selected to pursue wholly owned 
subsidiaries, combined with arm’s length intermediaries to address punctual risks.
Our general view on how to assess the content and unfolding of  a ‘new normal’ situa-
tion is therefore as follows. First, one needs to identify an impactful quantum change event 
at a higher level (typically spanning geographic and industry borders), which occurs in 
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period t – n, whereby t is the reference or current period and n is the time passed since the 
quantum change event. Second, it is critical to reflect on which strategic decision-making 
processes at the micro-level could be affected in period t + m (e.g., a company’s frequency 
of  bribery), in the sense of  a perceived need for transformational adaptation as a result 
of  the quantum change (Verbeke and Tung, 2013), whereby m is the time passed after 
the reference or current period. Third, it is important to account for how the current 
micro-level decision-making processes triggered by the earlier macro-level event could 
affect the future macro-level context for the firm (e.g., how might the business obstacles 
in the home country change). Fourth, given the presence of  both a macro-level triggering 
event and ensuing large-scale and high-frequency adaptation by micro-level actors, it is 
important to reflect on both downward and upward cascading effects. Upward cascading 
effects occur when particular managerial practices of  individual firms ultimately affect 
the unfolding of  processes at the macro-level (e.g., new business obstacles arising in the 
home country). In contrast, with downward cascading effects, an earlier major event 
triggers subsequent changes in managerial practices down to the micro-level. Cascades 
therefore reflect the impacts – whether positive or negative – that extend beyond an 
individual event or transaction to subsequent transactions and often to other economic 
actors (Levine and Kurzban, 2006), thus contributing to the ‘new normal.’ As such, our 
perspective is aligned with the important work of  Doh et al. (2012) who advocate a 
dual focus on the conventional strategy aspects and the non-market dimensions of  firm 
behaviour, whereby they implicitly acknowledge cascading effects when discussing the 
‘darker’ side of  the non-market context.
Existing Research on Corruption in Transition Economies
While the ‘new normal’ in the industrialized world has typically been associated with 
recent anti-globalization backlash (see Appendix A), the ‘new normal’ for entrepreneurs 
in transition economies combines norms from the past with new capitalist practices. In 
turn, the evolving nature of  the economy and society in transition economies suggests 
that corruption is constantly changing in volume as well as in form, mechanisms, and 
content (Christensen et al., 2019; Olimpieva, 2010). As such, the burden of  corruption 
weighs most heavily on entrepreneurs, who are the engine of  growth and employment 
in most transition economies (Anderson and Gray, 2006). Here, we observe the bribery 
paradox: because entrepreneurs are embedded in social contexts in transition economies, 
each bribe may bring an immediate one-time privilege to the entrepreneur, but in the 
longer run the corrupt behaviour also spreads to hurt the welfare of  other businesses 
in the community as well as one’s own business, as more entrepreneurs begin paying 
bribes to government officials for resources. Therefore, as countries move from a com-
mand-and-control economy to a transition economy, the study of  corruption is particu-
larly interesting since a ‘new normal’ develops, whereby market forces create new wealth, 
but also challenges on how to curb new drivers of  corruption (Anderson and Gray, 2006).
More specifically, after 1989, transition economies underwent a quantum change by 
abandoning central planning and embarking on a market capitalist path of  economic 
development supported by the Washington Consensus (Estrin et al., 2013; Kornai, 
2000). A type of  ‘chaotic capitalism’ (Lane, 2008, p. 177) ensued for decades after these 
countries’ implementation of  Washington Consensus-style policies: Informal networks, 
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cronyism, and bribery affected the daily interactions between post-socialist entrepre-
neurs in search of  new business opportunities and the government (Round et al., 2008). 
This led to bribery becoming legitimized and normalized in the entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity-seeking sphere (Christensen et al., 2019), rather than an exception as intended by 
the Washington Consensus policies. Despite the many anti-corruption measures taken, 
‘corruption remains a widespread and persistent problem’ in transition economies to 
date (Batory, 2012, pp. 67–68).
Transition economies are plagued by corruption due to institutional frailties (Estrin et 
al., 2013). Such frailties can take the form of  institutional voids (i.e., shortages of  effective 
macro-level institutional mechanisms that support business) as well as institutional over-
kill (i.e., an overabundance of  ineffective governance mechanisms that hinder business) 
(Olimpieva, 2009; Verbeke and Kano, 2013). In turn, corruption in many transition 
economies is associated with a variety of  downward cascading effects: reduced foreign 
direct investment, misdirected entrepreneurial talent, increases in venture start-up costs, 
expansion of  the informal economy, etc. (Clarke and Xu, 2004; Djankov et al., 2002; 
Doh et al., 2012; Misangyi et al., 2008). As open and fair mechanisms for distributing 
resources are hindered due to corruption, everyone in the community suffers because 
of  the need to pay bribes for public services (Li et al., 2015). Although some scholars 
acknowledge that corruption can accrue certain benefits in transition economies by al-
lowing entrepreneurs to bypass bureaucracy (Christensen et al., 2019; Olimpieva, 2009, 
2010) and get vital jobs done (Li et al., 2015), for the most part, corruption is viewed as 
a ‘willful perversion of  order, ideals and perhaps most important, trust – a “moral de-
terioration”’ (Ashforth et al., 2008, p. 671). Corruption is thereby at the core of  a ‘new 
normal’ business environment in transition economies.
Bribery and more informal exchanges of  gifts, hereafter referred to as ‘bribery’ for 
ease of  exposition, are particularly prevalent forms of  corruption that affect entrepre-
neurs in transition economies (Martin et al., 2007; McCarthy et al., 2012; Ufere et al., 
2012). While bribes can be mutually beneficial to both the payer and public official, 
such as when the payer receives a reduced tariff  in exchange for a bribe, they can also 
benefit only the government official and be predatory, such as when the bribe adds an 
additional cost to the official price of  a public good (Karhunen et al., 2018). In explor-
ing entrepreneurs’ propensity to bribe, researchers often take a demand- or supply-side 
perspective. The demand-side of  bribery, which until recently dominated the literature, 
focuses on downward cascading effects: public officials’ initiation of  bribery payments, 
and how they demand bribes to conduct business transactions (Ashforth et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2008). A central assumption with this perspective is that the only corruption 
and coercion associated with bribery is on the part of  the public officials demanding 
bribes (Martin et al., 2007) because the illicit payment is not voluntary and its purpose 
is to acquire government services that one is legally entitled to receive (Karhunen et al., 
2018). The demand-side of  bribery is often portrayed as ‘defensive corruption’ that is 
necessary for SMEs’ survival; if  they do not pay the bribe, an SME can be stopped from 
performing business by corrupt public officials (Karhunen et al., 2018; Olimpieva, 2009).
In contrast, the supply-side perspective focuses on upward cascading effects; i.e., the 
strategic choice of  entrepreneurs to initiate bribes in hopes of  maximizing economic ben-
efits for their firms (Martin et al., 2007; Ufere et al., 2012). The supply-side recognizes 
 The Bribery Paradox in Transition Economies 7
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
how the firm’s participation in the illicit exchange is often voluntary as it aims to gain 
preferential treatment from a public official, thus making the bribe mutually beneficial 
for both parties (Karhunen et al., 2018). For example, entrepreneurs may offer bribes to 
access limited government goods, obtain permits and licenses, reduce taxation, and relax 
regulatory oversight. Entrepreneurs often justify the solicitation of  an illicit exchange 
because the bribes allow their firms to compete with more powerful companies and to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with government bureaucracy (Ufere et al., 2012). 
Similarly, perceived competitive intensity and constraining conditions increase an SME’s 
supply of  bribes to ‘get things done’ (Martin et al., 2007, p. 1416).
While research like this has contributed to our understanding of  entrepreneurs’ be-
haviour in transition economies and has shifted some of  the blame of  corruption from 
downward cascades initiated by public officials to upward cascades initiated by entrepre-
neurs, we go one step further. We develop a sensemaking perspective that portrays how 
entrepreneurs not only experience immediate effects from bribes, but also contribute to 
shaping their own ‘new normal’ at the micro-level through their responses to the ‘new 
normal’ at the macro-level.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT: A SENSEMAKING PERSPECTIVE ON 
CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Bribery Frequency’s Effect on Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Business 
Obstacles
Sensemaking refers to processes by which ‘people generate what they interpret’ (Weick, 
1995, p. 13). First introduced by Garfinkel (1967), the sensemaking framework seeks to 
explain how individuals’ actions are influenced by, and in turn influence, their inter-
action and interpretation of  reality. It is based on the idea that ‘reality is an on-going 
accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense 
of  what occurs’ (Weick, 1993, p. 635). In this way, sensemaking explains how individuals 
interpret their environment based on their actions and become authors of  their own 
version of  ‘reality’ (Petriglieri, 2015). Whether or not that version of  reality is accurate 
is not a concern to sensemaking because action generates new information that allows 
individuals to (re)assess their causal beliefs, thereby leading to new action (Weick et al., 
2005). This process of  action and interpretation over time can alter the very environment 
under consideration (Porac et al., 1989), thus making individuals active participants in 
the environment they seek to understand.
Sensemaking often begins when individuals are confronted with an ambiguous event 
or issue that is important to them (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014), in our case whether to 
bribe. The action taken, or not taken, then reduces equivocality by shaping what is most 
salient in the situation and shaping one’s view of  the environment (Brown et al., 2015). 
Equivocality causes individuals to focus on particular environmental cues and ‘to use 
these in order to “make sense” of  occurrences and to enact their environment’ (Brown 
et al., 2015, p. 267). As such, sensemaking explains how individuals author their reali-
ties through a continuous process of  action and interpretation that, over time, creates a 
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repertoire of  plots and norms of  action, allowing them to make sense of  their environ-
ment and to see their environment as predictable and stable. Accordingly, we draw from 
sensemaking to explain how bribery can become a norm of  action for entrepreneurs that 
thereby causes them to perceive a ‘new normal’ business environment that is harsh and 
constraining.
Research has proposed that corruption can become institutionalized and normative in 
an organization when an initial corrupt decision or act becomes embedded in a firm’s 
managerial practices, and eventually routinized (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Misangyi 
et al., 2008). For example, those who pay bribes more frequently are likely to create a 
repertoire of  bribery activities that becomes embedded in routine business practices. In 
other words, once an entrepreneur begins to frequently pay bribes for public services, a 
cycle of  bribery ensues, whereby the entrepreneur will likely identify additional reasons 
to pay bribes to public officials. Research has long made the distinction that ‘small firms 
bribe whereas large firms lobby’ (Harstad and Svensson, 2011, p. 56). ‘[L]arge firms use 
their influence to change laws and regulations’ whereas privately held SMEs tend to ‘pay 
bribes to mitigate the cost of  government regulation’ (Harstad and Svensson, 2011, p. 57) 
and obtain government services such as utilities, permits and licenses (Olimpieva, 2009; 
Ufere et al., 2012). For this reason, we focus on privately owned SMEs since they do not 
have the bargaining power or economic clout of  large, public corporations to defend 
themselves against corrupt public officials (Chen et al., 2008; Verbeke et al., 2014) and 
their entrepreneurs are the key decision-makers who decide whether to bribe (Martin 
et al., 2007; Ufere et al., 2012). In line with sensemaking logic, entrepreneurs engaged on 
this upward cascading path of  corruption will likely come to see bribes as an appropriate 
response to their business challenges, with the payment of  bribes becoming a frequent 
behaviour, thereby creating a ‘new normal’ business environment at their micro-level.
We can then envision the subsequent, downward cascading of  bribery demands by 
public officials: entrepreneurs who frequently pay bribes will likely gain a reputation for 
acquiescing to demands for bribes. Once an entrepreneur is known for paying bribes, 
other corrupt officials may approach the entrepreneur demanding ‘their share’ of  pay-
ments. That is, those entrepreneurs who more frequently pay bribes are likely to signal 
their willingness to make illicit payments for government services and public goods, thus 
becoming preferred and more frequent targets of  corrupt officials. A ‘new normal’ busi-
ness environment ensues, fraught with dysfunctional upward and downward cascades 
of  bribing behaviour. Indeed, research on organized crime suggests that those who ac-
quiesce to demands often embolden corruption (Sutter et al., 2013). Over time, a ‘new 
normal’ system of  bribery develops with contracting parties becoming serial bribers and 
corruptible officials.
Although bribes may have been made to gain a competitive advantage (Ashforth et 
al., 2008; Clarke and Xu, 2004; Martin et al., 2007; Misangyi et al., 2008), sensemaking 
suggests that through their enactment, entrepreneurs are paradoxically also creating an 
environment that is perceived as more constraining to them. Further, given the action- 
interpretation cycle of  sensemaking, entrepreneurs who frequently pay bribes will likely 
focus more on the roots of  corruption in their business environment, thereby making the 
perception of  obstacles more salient. This is consistent with research on stress, explain-
ing how the frequency with which a job stressor occurs increases individuals’ mental 
 The Bribery Paradox in Transition Economies 9
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
preoccupation with obstacles at work (Eib et al., 2015). Those who partake in more 
frequent bribes will therefore develop a mental model of  the ‘new normal’ business envi-
ronment that is harsh and constraining.
In contrast, the ‘new normal’ business environment is expected to be perceived quite 
differently by those entrepreneurs who rarely pay bribes. Entrepreneurs who rarely pay 
bribes will likely perceive their institutional environment as more supportive of  business, 
and will have adapted their behaviour to mitigate the demands for bribes and the need 
to supply bribes to public officials. Indeed, Chen et al. (2008) argued that a ‘record of  
not condoning bribery is the best signal that a firm can provide to government officials’ 
(p. 240). A reluctance to bribe promotes sensemaking that informs the entrepreneurs’ 
mental framework and guides the interpretation of  the business environment positively. 
Through repeated action of  not paying bribes, the entrepreneur will come to perceive 
this reality as ‘how things ought to be done’ and ‘how things are done’. Thus, the lived 
histories (Weick, 1995) of  entrepreneurs who rarely pay bribes will enact a ‘new nor-
mal’ business environment perceived as less constraining in comparison to those who 
frequently pay bribes. The above predicted differences in sensemaking between fre-
quently bribing and non-bribing SMEs would appear especially relevant in the context 
of  transition economies, where institutions are in flux, and where different entrepreneurs 
may perceive the unfolding of  very different new realities in their business environment. 
Accordingly, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: In transition economies, entrepreneurs’ frequency of  bribes is positively 
related to their perceived degree of  business obstacles in the institutional environment.
How Family vs. Nonfamily Firm Owners Sense make Frequent Bribes
As interest in studying entrepreneurship in transition economies has grown (Aidis et al., 
2008), research has started to consider family and nonfamily firms’ propensity to pay 
bribes. While some research suggests family firms may be more willing to pay bribes 
than nonfamily firms (Bassetti et al., 2015), other evidence suggests that family firms 
are less likely to pay bribes (Ding et al., 2016). Although research like this is important 
in understanding why family firm owners may support or abhor bribery, it assumes that 
both family and nonfamily firm owners perceive bribes as contributing to a strategic ad-
vantage and a way to lessen business obstacles. However, this may not be the case; family 
and nonfamily firm owners may interpret the consequences from their bribery activity 
differently. Because the family’s identity is inextricably tied to a family firm (Dyer and 
Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2010), owners of  family firms are more likely to consider 
how their bribes will impact the next generation and the family’s legacy. Conversely, 
owners of  nonfamily firms may view the impact of  their bribes more positively as they 
are not as burdened by family identity concerns. In developing our framework on the 
enactment of  corruption, we therefore argue that whether an entrepreneur leads a fam-
ily or nonfamily firm will affect perceptions of  the ‘new normal’ business environment 
associated with his/her bribing activity.
Both the demand- and supply-sides of  corruption explain why owners of  family 
and nonfamily firm should perceive the environmental consequences from their bribes 
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differently. Due to the shared history and inextricable tie between the family and busi-
ness, the family serves both sensemaking and sense-giving functions for family firms, 
thereby shaping how owners of  family firms author and view their reality (Zellweger et 
al., 2010). Thus, in making sense of  their business environment in light of  their bribery 
frequency, family firm owners will view their reality through the lens of  their family, 
considering what their actions mean to the family’s identity and the next generation. 
From the demand side of  corruption, family firm owners may perceive frequent bribes 
as increasing business obstacles in their environment because they contemplate how their 
actions affect the family’s reputation and create incentives for corrupt officials to demand 
more bribes from their family firm. Research on the social contagion of  corruption (Gino 
et al., 2009) suggests that once a family firm is perceived by public officials as paying 
bribes, an enduring reputation is formed signalling the family’s willingness to make il-
licit payments. Further, because family firms typically employ multiple family members, 
corrupt officials may also demand bribes from family employees when a family firm is 
known to frequently pay bribes. As a family firm becomes a beacon for corrupt officials 
looking for bribes, the family firm owners’ engagement in retrospective and prospective 
thinking will lead them to see their reality as fraught with business obstacles. From a 
sensemaking perspective, we thus predict that family firms frequently paying bribes will 
come to see their environment as infected by corruption and business obstacles.
In comparison, for those family firm owners who rarely pay bribes despite demands, 
their view of  the business environment is expected to be more positive because they will 
view their actions as protecting the family’s ‘good name’. By being able to avoid paying 
bribes, family firm owners are likely to create a shared mental model within their family 
that abhors bribery and values business practices that are transparent and legitimate. 
Thus, for family firms that rarely acquiesce to bribery demands, a virtuous cycle is likely 
to be created whereby the refusal and avoidance of  bribes leads family firm owners to 
enact an environment with fewer perceived business obstacles in comparison to those 
family firms that frequently pay bribes.
A similar pattern is expected from the supply side. Social contagion suggests that family 
employees are likely to mimic each other’s attitudes and behaviours due to their relational 
closeness. As a result, family members will generate and share ‘family recipes’ regarding 
bribery practices, with some learning to deal with business obstacles by supplying bribes 
and family employees of  other family firms learning to rarely, if  ever, offer bribes. For fam-
ily firms that frequently pay bribes, the inherent interdependence between the family and 
business will likely cause family members to feel vicariously responsible for other family 
members’ unethical deeds (Litz and Turner, 2013). From a supply side, this suggests that 
not only do family members learn to emulate the family firm owner’s bribery practices, 
but also that they inherit the responsibility for such actions due to their shared family 
identity. As a result, as the supply of  bribes becomes more frequent and a routine business 
practice, it is likely that the added monetary and emotional costs will take a toll on the fam-
ily firm owners, causing them to view their business environment more negatively. From 
a sensemaking perspective, we thus predict that although family firms that frequently pay 
bribes are likely seeking an unfair strategic advantage, over time they will come to see their 
environment as infected by corruption and business obstacles because they view their busi-
ness environment from the perspective of  their family’s identity and future.
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However, for nonfamily firm owners, we expect a different sensemaking process as 
they are not burdened by their family’s involvement in the business, nor are they likely 
to view their business’s reality through the lens of  their family. Rather, nonfamily firm 
owners tend to have individualistic and utilitarian motives that allow them to rationalize 
their unethical behaviour because they see their actions as promoting their personal in-
terests and economic goals (Ding et al., 2016; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Longenecker et 
al., 1989). Indeed, in situations where entrepreneurs are able to accrue financial benefits 
at the expense of  others, they appear most susceptible to demands and pressures to be-
have unethically and to rationalize their behaviour (Longenecker et al., 1989). Indeed, 
research on ethical decision-making explains how low psychological closeness and a lack 
of  strong emotional bonds at work lessen an individual’s ability to see adverse effects 
from their unethical actions (Mencl and May, 2009). Further, research on the cognitive 
consequences of  unethical behaviour suggests that for those who do not feel guilt or see 
their transgressions as affecting individuals close to them, moral disengagement is likely, 
whereby they cognitively recast their unethical behaviour as acceptable and necessary 
(Gaspar et al., 2015; Shu et al., 2011). From the demand-side of  corruption this suggests 
that relative to family firms, owners of  nonfamily firms will be less likely to critically eval-
uate the outcomes of  their acquiescence to bribery demands and more likely to identify 
utilitarian benefits from their bribes. As such, because the ethics of  acquiescing more 
frequently to bribes is less salient relative to family firm owners, nonfamily firm own-
ers should view their business environment more positively as their frequency of  bribes 
increases.
The supply-side of  corruption also explains why nonfamily firm owners should see 
more of  a benefit from their bribes than family firm owners. Entrepreneurs tend to 
view a decision as ethical when it promotes their personal financial interests, even at the 
expense of  others (Longnecker et al., 1989). By focusing primarily on their self-interest, 
they are able to rationalize misdeeds and cognitively recast their bribes as acceptable be-
cause they see their business’s success as dependent on their own efforts. Indeed, research 
suggests that owners of  nonfamily firms tend to believe that their bribes provide a high 
return on investment by helping them to compete with large corporations (Ufere et al., 
2012). From a sensemaking perspective, nonfamily firm owners may therefore view the 
consequences from their bribes in a more positive light than family firm owners because 
they are likely to perceive their bribes as a personal decision rather than a reflection on 
their family and also as serving a utilitarian purpose.
We therefore argue that a family’s involvement in a business causes entrepreneurs to 
interpret the consequences of  their bribery activity more harshly because they view their 
actions through the lens of  the family, thus attending to how their bribes reflect the fam-
ily’s identity and the future that they are authoring for the next generation. Conversely, 
without the presence of  one’s family in the business, nonfamily firm owners can distance 
their bribery activity from their family and rationalize that the bribes are helpful to their 
business. With an emphasis on more short-term, personal goals rather than long-term, 
family goals, nonfamily firm owners therefore make sense of  their bribes through a more 
utilitarian lens that encourages them to view their frequent bribes as producing a more 
positive, ‘new normal’ business environment.
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Hypothesis 2: In transition economies, family firm status augments the positive rela-
tionship between entrepreneurs’ frequency of  bribes and their perceived degree of  
business obstacles in the institutional environment.
METHODOLOGY
Data Sources and Sample
We tested our framework with survey data from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) as provided by the World Bank in conjunction with the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). All researchers were rig-
orously trained how to handle the discussion of  sensitive topics like corruption, which 
helps responders ‘discuss corruption with remarkable candor’ (Reinikka and Svensson, 
2006, p. 365).
The BEEPS survey includes firms from the transition economies in the former Soviet 
Union and Turkey (BEEPS, 2002, 2005) in a variety of  industries (BEEPS, 2005). Turkey 
is not considered a transition economy, so we excluded it from our study. The surveys were 
designed for SMEs and so most of  the respondents were owners of  SMEs (Commander 
and Svejnar, 2011) – i.e., between 82 per cent and 90 per cent in 2002 (BEEPS, 2002, 
p. 19) and 86 per cent and 92 per cent in 2005 (BEEPS, 2005, p. 9). We focused on the 
2002 and 2005 waves as they include firms surveyed in both years, making it possible 
to track the same firms over time using the unique firm-identifying variable ‘seno2002’ 
(Commander and Svejnar, 2011). In turn, this allowed us to assess how entrepreneurs’ 
2002 frequency of  bribery affected their 2005 perceived degree of  business obstacles, 
after controlling for their 2002 perceived degree of  business obstacles.
Our starting sample included the 1,446 firms that were interviewed in both 2002 and 
2005. As our theory pertains to owners of  SMEs in the private (i.e., non-state-owned) 
sector, we focused on firms whose legal status was: single proprietorship, partnership, co-
operative, privately held corporation, or other private sector entity (variable S2b = 1 in 
both BEEPS waves).1  Of  these private sector firms, we excluded firms quoted on stock 
exchanges (variable S2a = 5 in both BEEPS waves) and large firms with more than 250 
full-time employees (variables S4b = 3 in BEEPS 2005 and S4a2 = 3 in BEEPS 2002). 
We further removed missing/unknown values for most of  the variables in our study; for 
the level of  bribes control variable, we substituted missing values with zero to prevent 
unnecessary sample loss. This yielded 356 privately held SMEs with data in both years 
on the variables in our study. We then created a cross-sectional dataset of  these 356 firms 
whereby the explanatory variables are for 2002, keeping the industry and country effects 
as of  2005, and the dependent variable is for 2005. To preserve degrees of  freedom for the 
subsequently included country and industry dummies, we discarded firms that had less 
than two observations for each industry per country in 2005 based on variables ‘a1’ (the 
country code in both BEEPS waves) and ‘S3’ (the industry code in both BEEPS waves).
Our final sample included 310 SMEs in 22 countries: Albania (20), Armenia (16), 
Azerbaijan (22), Belarus (7), Bulgaria (21), Croatia (4), Czech Republic (13), Former 
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Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia (4), Georgia (10), Hungary (21), Kazakhstan (13), 
Kyrgyz Republic (9), Latvia (5), Lithuania (8), Moldova (8), Poland (22), Romania (16), 
Russia (6), Slovak Republic (2), Slovenia (38), Ukraine (43), and Uzbekistan (2). The in-
dustries included Construction (35), Manufacturing (95), Transport storage and commu-
nication (15), Wholesale and retail trade (115), Real estate, renting, and business services 
(22), Hotels and restaurants (21), and Other services (7).
Measures
Dependent variable. We captured entrepreneurs’ Perceived Degree of  Business Obstacles with the 
question: ‘Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the operation 
and growth of  your business?’. This measure was the average of  18 items that can be 
influenced by the bribery of  public officials2  (see Online Appendix), ranging from 1 (no 
obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle).
Independent variable. We captured Frequency of  Bribes with the question: ‘Thinking now of  
unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in a given year, could you 
please tell me how often would they make payments/gifts for the following purposes’. 
Framing the question with ‘a firm like yours’ instead of  ‘your firm’ is standard practice 
in research on sensitive topics like bribery, as it helps reduce social desirability and ‘holier 
than thou’ biases: i.e., firms over-reporting good behaviour and under-reporting bad 
behaviour (Martin et al., 2007; Spencer and Gomez, 2011). Asking indirect questions 
about sensitive topics results in more honest responses to questions than direct questions 
(Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006). In addition, indirect questioning allows 
interviewees to reflect more deeply about their behaviours when they were not being 
monitored by the interviewer (Lusk and Norwood, 2009, 2010). To further encourage 
honest responses, such sensitive questions were only asked later in the survey, once the 
interviewer and the respondent had established a rapport (Lee and Weng, 2013).
Our measure of  frequency of  bribes focuses on firms’ additional costs of  doing busi-
ness, such as obtaining government services that they are entitled to (e.g., obtaining li-
censes and permits) and dealing with bureaucracy during the regular course of  doing 
business (e.g., passing inspections, dealing with courts or imports and customs) (see 
Online Appendix). We did not take into account bribes to obtain government contracts 
because this type of  bribery is different from that which supports normal business opera-
tions and is meant to facilitate business-government contracting. We also excluded items 
that represent intentional state capture aimed to shape government policy or legislation 
(i.e., bribing to influence the content of  new legislation) as research suggests that such 
bribery pertains more to large, public corporations than SMEs (Harstad and Svensson, 
2011). Our measure was the average of  8 items where each item ranges from 1 (Never) 
to 6 (Always), with greater values indicating greater frequency of  bribery.
Moderator variable. We captured Family Firm by assigning 1 to firms whose largest 
shareholder was a family or individual, owning at least 50.01 per cent of  the company, 
and 0 otherwise (Ang et al., 2000; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). The variable was 
based on questions Q4aa_r1 in BEEPS 2005 (corresponding to Question Q4a_r1 in 
BEEPS 2002): ‘Which of  the following best describes the largest shareholder(s) in your 
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firm?’ and Q3a in both BEEPS waves: ‘What per cent of  your firm does the largest 
shareholder(s) own?’ (divided by 100 to obtain 0-1 scale). Overall, 50.97 per cent of  the 
sample were family firms.
Control variables. Lastly, we controlled for a series of  factors summarized in Table I.
Statistical Analysis
As our dependent variable is bounded between 1 and 4, we tested our framework in Stata 
15.1/SE with the two-limit Tobit model (Tobin, 1958). We standardized the right-hand 
side variables, except for the industry and country dummies, for ease of  interpretation. 
Please refer to the Online Appendix for the common method variance, construct validity, 
multicollinearity, and heteroskedasticity tests we performed.
Hypothesis Testing
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table II. The Tobit regressions follow in Table III. 
Models 1-4 show the results without robust standard errors. Model 5 adjusts the standard 
errors to be robust to heteroskedasticity. Both Models 4 and 5 yield qualitatively similar 
conclusions, so we tested our hypotheses on the more parsimonious Model 4.
Hypothesis 1 proposed that entrepreneurs’ prior frequency of  bribes subsequently 
raises their perceived degree of  business obstacles. The positive and significant coefficient 
for Frequency of  Bribesi,2002 (b = +0.077, p < 0.05) supports this hypothesis and reveals the 
effect is present and statistically significant. The conditional marginal effect, keeping the 
other variables at their means, is also significant: dy/dx = +0.075, P >|z| = 0.027.3 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that family firms perceive greater business obstacles from 
higher frequency of  bribes than do nonfamily firms. This positive and significant coeffi-
cient for the interaction between Frequency of  Bribesi,2002 and Family Firmi,2002 (b = +0.078, 
p < 0.01) supports this hypothesis. The marginal effect of  frequency of  bribes is positive 
and significant for the family firms (dy/dx = +0.145, P >|z| = 0.001) but not statistically 
significant for the nonfamily firms (dy/dx = −0.009, P >|z| = 0.842). Further, the mar-
ginal effect indicates that perceived business obstacles are 16.11 times greater for family 
firms than for nonfamily firms who frequently bribe (i.e., 0.145/0.009), supporting our 
hypothesis. Figure 1 graphs the interaction effect from the predictive margins of  the 
expected value of  the observed dependent variable for family vs. nonfamily firms, keep-
ing the other variables at their means. It provides visual support for Hypothesis 2. The 
Online Appendix provides additional robustness tests we performed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
How does the frequency that entrepreneurs pay bribes affect their perception of  the 
‘new normal’ business environment in a transition economy? Do entrepreneurs who 
frequently pay bribes see the bribes as ‘grease money’ that lessen their business obsta-
cles? Or rather, do they see their frequent payment of  bribes as ‘sand in the wheels of  
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progress’ that increases their business obstacles? To answer these questions we developed 
a sensemaking perspective of  corruption that explains how entrepreneurs enact their 
‘new normal’ business environment through their repeated paying of  bribes, or their 
refraining from doing so.
Our findings reveal the presence of  a bribery paradox: entrepreneurs may pay bribes 
in an effort to reduce obstacles and gain an unfair competitive advantage in the short 
run, but at the same time, they enact a longer-term, ‘new normal’ business environment 
that is perceived to be rich in institutional impediments. Further, our study reveals that 
owners of  family and nonfamily firms who frequently pay bribes author the reality of  
their ‘new normal’ differently. In making sense of  their business environment in light of  
their bribery activity, owners of  family firms view their ‘new normal’ through the lens 
of  the family, leading to greater perceived business obstacles as the frequency of  bribes 
increases. Conversely, the perceived level of  business obstacles does not intensify as the 
frequency of  bribes increases for owners of  nonfamily firms. As such, our study demon-
strates why some entrepreneurs see bribes as ‘grease money’ that reduces business obsta-
cles and others see bribes as ‘sand in the wheels of  progress’ that amplifies such obstacles. 
Our sensemaking perspective of  corruption therefore explains how entrepreneurs are ac-
tive participants in the environment that author different versions of  their ‘new normal’ 
based on the frequency of  their bribes and whether they lead a family or nonfamily firm.
Unlike most previous research that has focused on explaining why entrepreneurs pay 
bribes (Martin et al., 2007; Ufere et al., 2012), instead we sought to investigate how 
entrepreneurs perceive their business environment after frequently paying, or not pay-
ing, bribes and how this perception is influenced by their identity and the associated 
social context. Here, we developed a nuanced perspective of  corruption in transition 
economies by recognizing the heterogeneity among entrepreneurs in terms of  a key 
Figure 1. The moderating effect of  family firm status on the relationship between frequency of  bribes and 
perceived degree of  business obstacles for entrepreneurs in transition economies
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dimension: family firm status. More specifically, we hypothesized that family firm status 
would strengthen the predicted positive relationship between frequency of  bribes and 
the perceived degree of  business obstacles facing a firm because family firms sense make 
using a family lens. In contrast, nonfamily firm owners were hypothesized to perceive a 
more positive business environment as their frequency of  bribes increased because they 
sense make using an economic lens. Thus, by considering how an entrepreneur’s identity 
and social context shape sensemaking, we were able to identify conditions under which 
entrepreneurs perceive a benefit from more frequent bribes as well as when entrepre-
neurs perceive greater business obstacles from frequent bribes.
Accordingly, our study contributes to research on entrepreneurs in transition econo-
mies by demonstrating how entrepreneurs are active authors of  their ‘new normal’ envi-
ronment. They do not only vary in their bribery activity but also in how they ultimately 
perceive their business environment as a result of  their frequency of  bribes. Our study 
contributes to the sensemaking literature by demonstrating how entrepreneurs’ actions 
influence their perception of  reality over time. Those who frequently paid bribes tend 
to view their ‘new normal’ business environment as ridden with obstacles. Conversely, 
those who infrequently paid bribes tend to view their ‘new normal’ business environ-
ment positively. By recognizing that owners of  family and nonfamily firms interpret their 
bribes and the associated environmental outcomes differently, we were able to explain 
why there is heterogeneity among entrepreneurs in transition economies in regards to 
how they perceive the ‘new normal’ business environment. As such, our study has im-
portant implications for theory and practice.
Implications for Theory
Our paper makes two contributions to theory. First, we have extended the burgeoning 
literature on corruption and bribery practices of  entrepreneurs and SMEs in transition 
economies. While prior studies on corruption have focused on the choice to extend illegal 
payments (Martin et al., 2007; Ufere et al., 2012), we have complemented this research 
by analysing the frequency with which illegal payments are extended, thus acknowl-
edging differences between entrepreneurs who occasionally pay bribes and those who 
have made bribery a common, habitual practice. Additionally, rather than focusing on 
entrepreneurs’ motivations to bribe, we instead focused on how bribery affects an en-
trepreneur’s perception of  the ‘new normal’ business environment. The findings from 
our study indicate that future research on entrepreneurs’ bribery activity in transition 
economies should not assume that more frequent bribes translate into fewer business ob-
stacles over time, nor that all entrepreneurs ultimately perceive their bribes as effectively 
applied ‘grease money.’ The opposite should actually be expected, especially for family 
firms, which appear to be creating a ‘new normal’ business environment, where bribery 
becomes a costly part of  business life, rather than solving extant business problems.
Second, we have extended the literature on sensemaking, which had not yet considered 
the context of  corruption or the frequency of  an action in shaping sensemaking. Previous 
research on corruption has, to date, mostly applied an efficiency-based angle that assumes 
firms gain an unfair competitive advantage from paying bribes (e.g., Li et al., 2015; Ufere 
et al., 2012; Verbeke and Kano, 2013). Conversely, a contribution of  our work is that we 
22 K. A. Eddleston et al. 
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
have uncovered a bribery paradox: frequent bribes can produce a ‘new normal’ business 
environment that is seen as ridden with obstacles, and therefore creates corruption cycles, 
with upward and downward cascading effects, and from which it is difficult to escape. 
Our view contributes to the sensemaking perspective by highlighting how a frequent 
action shapes what entrepreneurs attend to in their environment. By displaying corrupt 
behaviours through their bribes, they might generate a ‘new normal’ environment that 
they see as fundamentally corrupt. Here, we also contribute to the sensemaking perspec-
tive by highlighting how actors can interpret the consequences from the same behaviour 
differently. While previous research has often applied sensemaking to understand how 
identities are formed (Brown et al., 2015; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014), we propose 
instead that an entrepreneur’s identity and social context influence how corruption is en-
acted. This allowed us to put the entrepreneur at the centre of  the sensemaking process 
and explain why those who own family firms are likely to author their reality differently 
from those who own nonfamily firms, despite similar bribery frequency.
Implications for Practice
Our study has important implications for practice. First, when entrepreneurs engage 
in more frequent bribing, they may end up enacting a ‘new normal’ with higher rather 
than lower perceived business obstacles, thus creating a dangerous cycle. Such perceived 
increases in business obstacles may trigger additional bribery activity from both the sup-
ply- and demand-sides. High perceived business obstacles may also lead to other nega-
tive consequences such as reduced resources for productive investment, weaker business 
growth, and even firm closure. Although the purpose of  bribery may be to reduce institu-
tional frictions, our results suggest the opposite over time. Entrepreneurs should therefore 
be encouraged to limit their bribery activity, particularly those who own family firms. 
Otherwise, they will need to contend with a ‘new normal’ business environment of  in-
creased obstacles that will likely hamper their ability to manage their business.
Second, our study revealed that in comparison to owners of  nonfamily firms, owners 
of  family firms suffer more from the bribery paradox: they perceive greater business obsta-
cles over time as their frequency of  bribes increased. Thus, family firms should be espe-
cially cautious when contemplating bribery activities. Our findings suggest vicious cycles 
of  upward, downward and lateral cascading of  corruption materializing for family firms 
that frequently pay bribes. Internally, a family may breed corruption by normalizing 
bribery as a management practice, and externally, public officials in this ‘new normal’ 
may increasingly demand bribes from family firms that appear to support corruption. 
Over time, family firms may thereby come to see their business environment as popu-
lated with obstacles. Therefore, family firms would be wise to minimize and eliminate 
their bribery activities and to foster a culture of  ethical business practices that thereby 
creates a reputation for abhorring corruption.
Third, our study has relevance to policy makers in transition economies. While some 
prior studies have portrayed bribery as ‘grease money’ that lubricates the wheels of  com-
merce (Leff, 1964), others have found that bribery payments are ‘sand in the wheels of  
progress’ that hampers growth and increases inequality (Johnson et al., 2000). Our find-
ings tend to support the ‘sand’ side of  the debate, as we have shown that higher frequency 
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of  bribes tends to create a ‘new normal’ with perceived higher costs of  doing business for 
most entrepreneurs, and particularly those operating family firms. However, our results 
also revealed that frequent bribes tend to ‘grease the wheels of  commerce’ for owners of  
nonfamily firms. Hence, a ‘dual new normal’ comes into play: Approximately half  of  
the firms in a country may be sensing obstacles from bribes while the other half  perceive 
benefits in the newly created environment. We therefore advise policy makers to increase 
punishment and amplify the monitoring of  both the supply-side and demand-side of  
bribery. Such increased vigilance would help avoid vicious cycles of  escalating bribery 
and over time, as bribery becomes less frequent, could create a ‘new normal’ business 
environment that is perceived as more business-friendly.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our study is subject to a few caveats that offer new avenues for future research. First, 
because our data are for the 2002–05 period, caution should be used if  attempting to 
generalize the analyses beyond this timeframe. Future research can expand ours as more 
data become available beyond this period. Further, as our period of  investigation was 
prior to the global financial crisis of  2007, it would be interesting to assess whether our 
results hold after this crisis.
Second, we focused our framework on privately owned SMEs in transition economies. 
Future research can expand ours with a comparative analysis of  the degree of  business 
obstacles faced by larger, public firms and particularly, how their managers perceive busi-
ness obstacles in response to bribery activity. Due to their considerable market power, 
large, publicly held firms may experience less pressure to pay bribes and thus, perceive 
lower levels of  business obstacles than SMEs. Further, it is also likely that various types 
of  business obstacles (economic, regulatory, operational, or social) will affect large, public 
firms differently than SMEs.
Third, we focused our framework on transition economy SMEs due to the unique 
types of  economic challenges they are facing. However, corruption pressures are also 
found in other developing and developed economies. Thus, our sensemaking framework 
could be extended to contexts where entrepreneurs and public officials face similar eth-
ical dilemmas. For example, our theory implies that as entrepreneurs more frequently 
make unethical decisions, they will come to see their ‘new normal’ business environment 
as more burdensome. From a sensemaking perspective this suggests that their ‘virus-like’ 
actions will, over time, infect their views of  the business environment, thereby creating a 
vicious cycle of  negative acts and pessimistic views. But, on the bright side, our research 
also suggests that those entrepreneurs who behave ethically will create a ‘new normal’ 
business environment that they perceive optimistically. Although our study does not allow 
us to examine in detail whether the entrepreneurs’ perceptions translate into subsequent 
strategic decisions, future research can further explore this avenue.
Fourth, our analysis builds on the implicit but critical assumption that refusing to ex-
tend or accept bribes will be ‘socially protected’; i.e., will not lead to violent reactions from 
the refusal of  bribes. A limitation of  our analysis is that our measures only address the 
perceived degree of  business obstacles associated with bribery, but not other outcomes 
associated with personal or family safety (Sundström, 2016). For example, especially in 
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the context of  family firms, in addition to affecting perceived business obstacles, frequent 
bribes could be associated with concerns about a ‘new normal’ for personal and fam-
ily safety. Future research should, therefore, explore perceived threats associated with a 
refusal to pay a bribe. Additionally, there may be more severe consequences associated 
with some types of  bribes than others. For example, how do entrepreneurs make sense of  
routine bribes that every business appears to pay for a public service versus bribes paid to 
obtain a unique privilege (e.g., a monopolistic license)?
Fifth, although it would have been desirable to directly ask entrepreneurs from mul-
tiple transition economies about their own firm’s bribery activity, because corruption 
is a delicate topic for firm leaders to discuss openly, studies commonly use an indirect 
questioning approach to gage bribery (e.g., Blagoevic and Damijan, 2013; Spencer and 
Gomez, 2011; Svensson, 2003; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). However, studies, while rare, 
that directly ask firm leaders about their bribery activity also suffer from limitations such 
as underreporting of  bribes, truthfulness in responses, and a low response rate due to 
fear of  implicating oneself  in an illegal activity (De Jong et al., 2012; Krammer, 2019). 
Accordingly, research often asks respondents to indicate how frequently ‘a firm like yours’ 
engages in bribery and avoids asking ‘how frequently does your firm engage in bribery’ to 
mitigate misreporting and social desirability biases. The implication of  this indirect mea-
surement approach is that it may not fully capture bribery frequency of  the individual 
firm. This is a potential limitation of  all studies on corruption using the BEEPS database 
(e.g., Krammer, 2019) as well as other known databases on bribery activity such as the 
AIM Enterprise Survey (e.g., Mendoza et al., 2015) and World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) (e.g., Ayyagari et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2007; Tonoyan et al., 2010).
Conclusion
The main normative conclusion of  our analysis for entrepreneurs in transition econo-
mies, especially those running family firms, is to avoid extending bribes. Our findings 
reveal a bribery paradox: entrepreneurs may pay bribes in order to reduce perceived ob-
stacles in the business environment, but the end result may be an enacted, ‘new normal’ 
environment rich in institutional impediments to their business. Entrepreneurs operating 
family firms appear especially prone to enact a business environment that is perceived as 
hostile when they frequently bribe. Our research therefore suggests that owners of  family 
and nonfamily firms author their new realities differently. While the family lens leads 
family firm owners to view their bribes as creating a new, hostile business environment, 
the economic lens of  nonfamily firm owners leads them to see their bribes as lessening 
business obstacles. As such, the opposing views of  bribes as ‘grease money’ and ‘sand in 
the wheels of  progress’ are both correct; it just depends on who, an owner of  a family 
firm or nonfamily firm, is interpreting the ‘new normal’ business environment.
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NOTES
 [1] This step effectively excluded firms with missing legal status and firms from the state-owned sector: i.e., 
state/municipal/district-owned enterprises, corporatized state-owned enterprises, or other state-owned 
enterprises.
 [2] We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
 [3] This is the marginal effect of  the expected value of  the observed Perceived Degree of  Business Obstacles 
variable censored between 1 and 4 and obtained with the -margins, dydx predict(ystar(1,4)) atmeans- 
command in Stata, which describes how the observed dependent variable changes with respect to the 
regressor of  interest.
REFERENCES
Aidis, R., Estrin, S. and Mickiewicz, T. (2008). ‘Institutions and entrepreneurship development in Russia: A 
comparative perspective’. Journal of  Business Venturing, 23, 656–72.
Anderson, J. H. and Gray, C. W. (2006). Anticorruption in Transition 3: Who is Succeeding … and Why? Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Ang, J., Cole, R. and Lin, J. (2000). ‘Agency costs and ownership structure’. Journal of  Finance, 55, 81–106.
Ashforth, B. and Anand, V. (2003). ‘The normalization of  corruption in organizations’. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 25, 1–52.
Ashforth, B., Gioia, D., Robinson, S. and Trevino, L. (2008). ‘Re-viewing organizational corruption’. Academy 
of  Management Review, 33, 670–84.
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2014). ‘Bribe payments and innovation in developing 
countries: Are innovating firms disproportionately affected?’. Journal of  Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
49, 51–75.
Bass, B. M., Waldman, D. A., Avolio, B. J. and Bebb, M. (1987). ‘Transformational leadership and the falling 
dominoes effect’. Group & Organization Studies, 12, 73–87.
Bassetti, T., dal Maso, L. and Lattanzi, N. (2015). ‘Family businesses in Eastern European countries: How 
informal payments affect exports’. Journal of  Family Business Strategy, 6, 219–33.
Batory, A. (2012). ‘Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance per-
spective’. Regulation & Governance, 6, 66–82.
BEEPS. (2002). A Brief  Report on Observations, Experiences and Methodology from the Survey. Available at http://
ebrd-beeps.com/data (accessed 27 August 2018).
BEEPS. (2005). A Brief  Report on Observations, Experiences and Methodology from the Survey (r1). Available at http://
ebrd-beeps.com/data (accessed 27 August 2018).
Blagoevic, S. and Damijan, J. (2013). ‘The impact of  corruption and ownership on the performance of  firms 
in Central and Eastern Europe’. Post-Communist Economies, 5, 133–58.
Brown, A. D., Colville, I. and Pye, A. (2015). ‘Making sense of  sensemaking in organization studies’. 
Organization Studies, 36, 265–77.
Chen, Y., Yaşar, M. and Rejesus, R. (2008). ‘Factors influencing the incidence of  bribery payouts by firms: 
A cross-country analysis’. Journal of  Business Ethics, 77, 231–44.
Christensen, C. M., Ojomo, E. and Dillon, K. (2019). ‘Corruption is not the problem; It’s a solution’. In 
Christensen, C. M., Ojomo, E. and Dillon, K. (Eds.), The Prosperity Paradox: How Innovation Can Lift 
Nations Out of  Poverty. New York, NY: Harper Business.
Clarke, G. and Xu, L. (2004). ‘Privatization, competition, and corruption: How characteristics of  bribe tak-
ers and payers affect bribes to utilities’. Journal of  Public Economics, 88, 2067–97.
Commander, S. and Svejnar, J. (2011). ‘Business environment, exports, ownership, and firm Performance’. 
The Review of  Economics and Statistics, 93, 309–37.
Davis, I. (2009). The New Normal. McKinsey. Available at https ://www.mckin sey.com/busin essfu nctio ns/
strat egy-and-corpo rate-finan ce/our-insig hts/the-new-normal (accessed 11 December 2017).
De Jong, G., Tu, P. A. and van Ees, H. (2012). ‘Which entrepreneurs bribe and what do they get from it? 
Exploratory evidence from Vietnam’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36, 323–45.
Ding, S., Qu, B. and Wu, Z. (2016). ‘Family control, socioemotional wealth, and governance environment: 
The case of  bribes’. Journal of  Business Ethics, 136, 639–54.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002). ‘The regulation of  entry’. Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics, CXVII(1), 1–38.
Doh, J., Lawton, T. and Rajwani, T. (2012). ‘Advancing nonmarket strategy research: Institutional perspec-
tives in a changing world’. Academy of  Management Perspectives, 26, 22–39.
26 K. A. Eddleston et al. 
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Dyer, W. G. and Whetten, D. A. (2006). ‘Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary evidence from 
the S&P 500’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 785–802.
Eib, C., von Thiele Schwarz, U. and Blom, V. (2015). ‘Don’t let it get to you! A moderated mediated ap-
proach to the (in) justice–health relationship’. Journal of  Occupational Health Psychology, 20, 434–45.
El-Erian, M. A. (2010). ‘Navigating the New Normal in industrial countries’. International Monetary Fund, 15 
December, 12. Available at https ://www.imf.org/en/News/Artic les/2015/09/28/04/53/sp101010 
(accessed 18 October 2015).
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J. and Mickiewicz, T. (2013). ‘Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations?’. Journal of  Business Venturing, 28, 564–80.
Florida, R. (2010). The Great Reset: How New Ways of  Living and Working Drive Post-Crash Prosperity. New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers.
Fukuyama, F. (1989). ‘The end of  history’. The National Interest, 16, 3–18.
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Gaspar, J. P., Seabright, M. A., Reynolds, S. J. and Yam, K. C. (2015). ‘Counterfactual and factual reflection: 
The influence of  past misdeeds on future immoral behavior’. Journal of  Social Psychology, 155, 370–80.
Ghai, S., Tarnowski, M. and Tetrault, J. (2011). ‘The best of  times and the worst of  times for institutional in-
vestors: How institutional investors should adapt their strategies to the new investment climate’. McKinsey, 
Available at https ://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&sourc e=web&cd=1&ved=0a-
hUK EwjD2 4374Y LYAhV I44MK HQMnA 7wQFg gpMAA &url=https %3A%2F%2Fwww.mckin sey.
com%2F~%2Fmed ia%2Fmck insey %2Fdot com%2Fcli ent_servi ce%2Fpri vate%2520e quity %2Fpdf 
s%2Fthe_best_of_times_and_the_worst_of_times_for_insti tutio nal_inves tors.ashx&usg=AOvVa 
w0xW0 eHNHn vfSc--K4-1iTS (accessed 12 November 2017).
Gino, F., Ayal, S. and Ariely, D. (2009). ‘Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior the effect of  one 
bad apple on the barrel’. Psychological Science, 20, 393–98.
Grøgaard, B. and Verbeke, A. (2012). ‘Twenty key hypotheses that make internalization theory the general 
theory of  international strategic management’. In Verbeke, A. and Merchant, H. (Eds), Handbook of  
Research in International Strategic Management. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 7–30.
Harstad, B. and Svensson, J. (2011). ‘Bribes, lobbying, and development’. American Political Science Review, 105, 
46–63.
Hillemann, J., Verbeke, A. and Oh, W. Y. (2018). ‘Regional integration, multinational enterprise strategy 
and the impact of  country-level risk: The case of  the European Monetary Union’. British Journal of  
Management, https ://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12326 .
Holderness, C. and Sheehan, D. (1988). ‘The role of  majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An 
exploratory analysis’. Journal of  Financial Economics, 20, 317–46.
Johansson-Stenman, O. and Martinsson, P. (2006). ‘Honestly, what are you driving a BMW?’. Journal of  
Economic Behavior & Organization, 60, 129–46.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (2000). ‘Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial 
activity after communism’. Journal of  Public Economics, 76, 495–520.
Kaufmann, D. (1997). ‘Corruption: The facts’. Foreign Policy, 107, 114–31.
Karhunen, P., Kosonen, R., McCarthy, D. J. and Puffer, S. M. (2018). ‘The darker side of  social networks in 
transforming economies: Corrupt exchange in Chinese Guanxi and Russian Blat/Svyazi’. Management 
and Organization Review, 14, 395–419.
Kim, J., Weng, D. H. and Lee, S. H. (2018). ‘How does home country bribery affect firms’ foreign market 
focus? The case of  firms in transition economies’. Multinational Business Review, 26, 225–49.
Kobrin, S. (2017). ‘Bricks and mortar in a borderless world: Globalization, the backlash, and the multina-
tional enterprise’. Global Strategy Journal, 7, 159–71.
Kornai, J. (2000). ‘What the change of  system from Socialism to Capitalism does and does not mean’. Journal 
of  Economic Perspectives, 14, 27–42.
Krammer, S. M. (2019). ‘Greasing the wheels of  change: Bribery, institutions, and new product introductions 
in Emerging Markets’. Journal of  Management, 45, 1889–926.
Lane, D. (2008). ‘From chaotic to state-led capitalism’. New Political Economy, 13, 177–84.
Lee, S.-H. and Weng, D. (2013). ‘Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports?’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 34, 1472–87.
Leff, N. (1964). ‘Economic development through bureaucratic corruption’. American Behavioral Scientist, 8, 6–14.
Levine, S. S. and Kurzban, R. (2006). ‘Explaining clustering in social networks: Towards an evolutionary 
theory of  cascading benefits’. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27, 173–87.
Li, Y., Yao, F. K. and Ahlstrom, D. (2015). ‘The social dilemma of  bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic 
model of  emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty’. Asia Pacific Journal of  Management, 32, 311–34.
 The Bribery Paradox in Transition Economies 27
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Litz, R. A. and Turner, N. (2013). ‘Sins of  the father’s firm: Exploring responses to inherited ethical dilem-
mas in family business’. Journal of  Business Ethics, 113, 297–315.
Liu, D., Liao, H. and Loi, R. (2012). ‘The dark side of  leadership: A three-level investigation of  the cascad-
ing effect of  abusive supervision on employee creativity’. Academy of  Management Journal, 55, 1187–212.
Lockett, A., Currie, G., Finn, R., Martin, G. and Waring, J. (2014). ‘The influence of  social position on sen-
semaking about organizational change’. Academy of  Management Journal, 57, 1102–29.
Longenecker, J. G., McKinney, J. A. and Moore, C. W. (1989). ‘Ethics in small business’. Journal of  Small 
Business Management, 27, 27–31.
Lusk, J. L. and Norwood, F. B. (2010). ‘Direct versus indirect questioning: An application to the well-being 
of  farm animals’. Social Indicators Research, 96, 551–65.
Lusk, J. L. and Norwood, F. B. (2009). ‘Bridging the gap between laboratory experiments and naturally 
occurring markets: An inferred valuation method’. Journal of  Environmental Economics and Management, 
58, 236–50.
Maitlis, S. and Christianson, M. (2014). ‘Sensemaking in organizations: Taking stock and moving forward’. 
Academy of  Management Annals, 8, 57–125.
Martin, K., Cullen, J., Johnson, J. and Parboteeah, K. (2007). ‘Deciding to bribe: A cross-level analysis of  
firm and home country influences on bribery activity’. Academy of  Management Journal, 50, 1401–22.
McCarthy, D. J., Puffer, S. M., Dunlap, D. R. and Jaeger, A. M. (2012). ‘A stakeholder approach to the ethi-
cality of  BRIC-firm managers' use of  favors’. Journal of  Business Ethics, 109, 27–38.
Mencl, J. and May, D. R. (2009). ‘The effects of  proximity and empathy on ethical decision-making: An 
exploratory investigation’. Journal of  Business Ethics, 85, 201–26.
Mendoza, R. U., Lim, R. A. and Lopez, A. O. (2015). ‘Grease or sand in the wheels of  commerce? Firm level 
evidence on corruption and SMEs’. Journal of  International Development, 27, 415–39.
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K. and Peng, M. W. (2009). ‘Institutions, resources, and entry strategies 
in emerging economies’. Strategic Management Journal, 30, 61–80.
Misangyi, V., Weaver, G. and Elms, H. (2008). ‘Ending corruption: The interplay among institutional logics, 
resources, and institutional entrepreneurs’. Academy of  Management Review, 33, 750–70.
Olimpieva, I. B. (2009). ‘Background Corruption in Small and Medium-Size Business: A “Weapon of  the 
Weak”?’. Russian Politics & Law, 47, 28–42.
Olimpieva, I. (2010). ‘The changing contours of  corruption in Russia: Informal intermediaries in state-busi-
ness relations’. East-West Journal of  Economics and Business, 13, 61–82.
Petriglieri, J. (2015). ‘Co-creating relationship repair: Pathways to reconstructing destablized organizational 
identification’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 60, 518–57.
Porac, J., Thomas, H. and Baden-Fuller, C. (1989). ‘Competitive groups as cognitive communities: The case 
of  Scottish knitwear manufacturers’. Journal of  Management Studies, 26, 397–416.
Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2006). ‘Using micro-surveys to measure and explain corruption’. World 
Development, 34, 359–70.
Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K. and Eden, L. (2005). ‘Government corruption and the entry strategies of  
multinationals’. Academy of  Management Review, 30, 383–96.
Round, J., Williams, C. and Rogers, P. (2008). ‘Corruption in the post-Soviet workplace: The experiences of  
recent graduates in contemporary Ukraine’. Work, Employment, and Society, 22, 149–66.
Shu, L. L., Gino, F. and Bazerman, M. H. (2011). ‘Dishonest deed, clear conscience: When cheating leads 
to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting’. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 330–49.
Spencer, J. and Gomez, C. (2011). ‘MNEs and corruption: The impact of  national institutions and subsidi-
ary strategy’. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 280–300.
Sundström, A. (2016). ‘Violence and the costs of  honesty: Rethinking bureaucrats choices to take bribes’. 
Public Administration, 94, 593–608.
Sutter, C., Webb, J., Kistruck, G. and Bailey, A. (2013). ‘Entrepreneurs' responses to semi formal illegitimate 
institutional arrangements’. Journal of  Business Venturing, 28, 743–58.
Svensson, J. (2003). ‘Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of  firms’. Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics, 118, 207–30.
Thirlwell, M. (2010). ‘From the fall of  the wall to the fall of  the banks and beyond: Three persistent problems 
for the global economy’. Lowy Institute. Available at https ://www.lowyi nstit ute.org/publi catio ns/fall-
wall-fall-banks-and-beyond-three-persi stent-probl ems-global-economy (accessed 11 December 2017).
Tobin, J. (1958). ‘Estimation of  relationships for limited dependent variables’. Econometrica, 26, 24–36.
Tonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M. and Perlitz, M. (2010). ‘Corruption and entrepreneurship: How 
formal and informal institutions shape small firm behavior in transition and mature market economies’. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 803–31.
28 K. A. Eddleston et al. 
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Ufere, N., Perelli, S., Boland, R. and Carlsson, B. (2012). ‘Merchants of  corruption: How entrepreneurs 
manufacture and supply bribes’. World Development, 40, 2440–53.
Uhlenbruck, K., Rodriquez, P., Doh, J. and Eden, L. (2006). ‘The impact of  corruption on entry strategy: 
Evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies’. Organization Science, 17, 402–14.
UNODC. (2017). UNODC’s Action against Corruption and Economic Crime. Available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/ en/corru ption/ index.html (accessed 11 December 2017).
Verbeke, A. and Kano, L. (2013). ‘The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of  trading favors’. Asia 
Pacific Journal of  Management, 30, 409–31.
Verbeke, A., Osiyevskyy, O. and Zargarzadeh, A. (2014). ‘Internalization theory, entrepreneurship, and in-
ternational new ventures’. The Multinational Business Review, 22, 246–69.
Verbeke, A. and Tung, V. (2013). ‘The future of  stakeholder management theory: A temporal perspective’. 
Journal of  Business Ethics, 112, 529–43.
Weick, K. (1993). ‘The collapse of  sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster’. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 38, 628–52.
Weick, K. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations, Vol. 3. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K. and Obstfeld, D. (2005). ‘Organizing and the process of  sensemaking’. Organization 
Science, 16, 409–21.
Wolf, M. (2009). Fixing Global Finance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Yang, J., Zhang, Z. X. and Tsui, A. S. (2010). ‘Middle manager leadership and frontline employee perfor-
mance: Bypass, cascading, and moderating effects’. Journal of  Management Studies, 47, 654–78.
Yiu, D. and Makino, S. (2002). ‘The choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary: An institu-
tional perspective’. Organization Science, 13, 667–83.
Zellweger, T., Eddleston, K. and Kellermanns, F. (2010). ‘Exploring the concept of  familiness: Introducing 
family firm identity’. Journal of  Family Business Strategy, 1, 54–63.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of  this article at the publisher’s web 
site: 
APPENDIX A
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S SERIES OF ‘NEW NORMALS’ SINCE 
THE 1930S
The global economy went through four ‘new normal’ stages, summarized in Figure A1. The first new nor-
mal (1930s–1988) was dominated by the post-World War II ideology battle between capitalism and so-
cialism. The foundations of  the modern-day capitalist economic system were laid at the Bretton Woods 
conference with the creation of  the IMF and the World Bank that advocated limited government for eco-
nomic development.
The collapse of  the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the second phase with ‘the birth of  the current global 
economy’ (Thirlwell, 2010). Over the next decade, the transition economies in Eastern Europe embraced 
free markets and democratically elected governments. This led some scholars to question whether this was 
the end of  history due to the perceived ‘universalization of  Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of  human government’ (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 2). By the end of  the 20th century, the United Nations also 
ratified the ‘only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument’ in the world (UNODC, 2017).
The third phase of  the new normal began in 2003 as a ‘mini-Golden Age’ for the world economy 
(Thirlwell, 2010). The U.S. stock and housing markets were booming (Wolf, 2009). Multiple former Soviet 
republics joined the European Union by 2004.
The Global Financial Crisis of  2007 ushered a world-wide reset against globalization as the fourth new 
normal phase of  the world economy (Florida, 2010; Kobrin, 2017). This era is characterized by mediocre 
growth in industrialized countries, increased terrorism, inflationary pressures in previously prosperous 
emerging markets like China, overall dissatisfaction with global integration trends, and the emergence of  
the BRICS’ New Development Bank to counter the IMF-backed policies of  liberalization.
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